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ABSTRACT
Bayesian inference is an important technique throughout
statistics. The essence of Beyesian inference is to derive
the posterior belief updated from prior belief by the learned
information, which is a set of differentially private answers
under differential privacy. Although Bayesian inference can
be used in a variety of applications, it becomes theoretically
hard to solve when the number of differentially private an-
swers is large. To facilitate Bayesian inference under differ-
ential privacy, this paper proposes a systematic mechanism.
The key step of the mechanism is the implementation of
Bayesian updating with the best linear unbiased estimator
derived by Gauss-Markov theorem. In addition, we also ap-
ply the proposed inference mechanism into an online query-
answering system, the novelty of which is that the utility
for users is guaranteed by Bayesian inference in the form of
credible interval and confidence level. Theoretical and ex-
perimental analysis are shown to demonstrate the efficiency
and effectiveness of both inference mechanism and online
query-answering system.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data privacy issues frequently and increasingly arise for
data sharing and data analysis tasks. Among all the privacy-
preserving mechanisms, differential privacy has been widely
accepted for its strong privacy guarantee [8, 9]. It requires
that the outcome of any computations or queries is formally
indistinguishable when run with and without any particular
record in the dataset. To achieve differential privacy the
answer of a query is perturbed by a random noise whose
magnitude is determined by a parameter, privacy budget.
Existing mechanisms[10, 7, 2, 20] of differential privacy
only has a certain bound of privacy budget to spend on
all queries. We define the privacy bound as overall pri-
vacy budget and such system bounded differentially
private system. To answer a query, the mechanism al-
locates some privacy budget(also called privacy cost of the
query) for it. Once the overall privacy budget is exhausted,
either the database has to be shut down or any further query
would be rejected. To prevent budget depletion and extend
the lifetime of such systems, users have the burden to al-
locate privacy budget for the system. However, there is no
theoretical clue on how to allocate budget so far.
To save privacy budget, existing work uses the correlated
answers to make inference about new-coming queries. Cur-
rent literature falls into one of the following: 1. Query ori-
ented strategy. Given a set of queries(or answers) and the
bound of privacy budget, optimize answers according to the
correlation of queries[18, 4, 5]; 2. Data oriented strategy.
Given the privacy bound, maximize the global utility of re-
leased data[13, 26, 27]; 3. Inference oriented strategy.
Use traditional inference method, like MLE, to achieve an
inference result or bound[23, 24, 17]. All existing work can
only make point estimation, which provides limited useful-
ness due to lack of probability properties. Some work gives
an error tolerance of the inference, like [, δ]-usefulness[3].
However, Bayesian inference has not been achieved yet.
Bayesian inference is an important technique throughout
statistics. The essence of Beyesian inference is to derive the
posterior belief updated from prior belief by the learned in-
formation, which is a set of differentially private answers in
this paper. With Bayesian inference, a variety of applica-
tions can be tackled. Some examples are shown as follows.
• hypothesis testing. If a user(or an attacker) makes a
hypothesis that Alice’s income is higher than 50 thou-
sand dollars, given a set of Alice’s noisy income 1 ,
what is the probability that the hypothesis holds?
• credible interval and confidence level. If a user
requires an interval in which the true answer lies with
confidence level 95%, how can we derive such an inter-
val satisfying the requirement?
Other applications, like regression analysis, statistical in-
ference control and statistical decision making, can also be
facilitated by Bayesian inference.
Although having so many applications, Bayesian inference
becomes theoretically hard to solve when the number of dif-
ferentially private answers, denoted as “history” queries, is
large. This phenomenon is often referred as the curse of high
dimensionality if we treat each answer in “history” as an in-
dependent dimension. Because the derivation of posterior
belief involves a series of integrals of probability function 2 ,
1It complies with the assumption of differential privacy that
an adversary knows the income of all other people but Alice.
2For convenience and clearance, probability function only
has two meanings in this paper: probability density function
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we show later in this paper the complexity of the probability
function although it can be processed in a closed form3.
Contributions. This paper proposes a systematic mech-
anism to achieve Bayesian inference under differential pri-
vacy. Current query-answering mechanisms, like Laplace
mechanism[10] and exponential mechanism[21], have also
been incorporated in our approach. According to these
mechanisms, a set of “history” queries and answers with
arbitrary noises can be given in advance. The key step of
our mechanism is the implementation of Bayesian updating
about a new-coming query using the set of “history” queries
and answers. In our setting, uninformative prior belief is
used, meaning we do not assume any evidential prior belief
about the new query. At first, a BLUE(Best Linear Un-
biased Estimator) can be derived using Gauss-Markov the-
orem or Generalized Least Square method. Then we pro-
pose two methods, Monte Carlo(MC) method and Proba-
bility Calculation(PC) method, to approximate the proba-
bility function. At last, the posterior belief can be derived
by updating the prior belief using the probability function.
Theoretical and experimental analysis have been given to
show the efficiency and accuracy of two methods.
The proposed inference mechanism are also applied in an
online utility driven query-answering system. First, it can
help users specify the privacy budget by letting users de-
mand the utility requirement in the form of credible interval
and confidence level. The key idea is to derive the credible
interval and confidence level from the history queries using
Bayesian inference. If the derived answer satisfies user’s re-
quirement, then no budget needs to be allocated because the
estimation can be returned. Only when the estimation can
not meet the utility requirement, the query mechanism is
invoked for a differentially private answer. In this way, not
only the utility is guaranteed for users, but also the privacy
budget can be saved so that the lifetime of the system can
be extended. Second, We further save privacy budget by al-
locating the only necessary budget calculated by the utility
requirement to a query. Third, the overall privacy cost of
a system is also measured to determine whether the system
can answer future queries or not. Experimental evaluation
has been shown to demonstrate the utility and efficiency.
All the algorithms are implemented in MATLAB, and all
the functions’ names are consistent with MATLAB.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
We use bold characters to denote vector or matrix, normal
character to denote one row of the vector or matrix; sub-
script i, j to denote the ith row, jth column of the vector or
matrix; operator [·] to denote an element of a vector; θ, θˆ to
denote the true answer and estimated answer respectively;
AQ to denote the differentially private answer of Laplace
mechanism.
2.1 Differential privacy and Laplace mecha-
nism
for continuous variables and probability mass function for
discrete variables.
3A closed form expression can be defined by a finite number
of elementary functions(exponential, logarithm, constant,
and nth root functions) under operators +,−,×,÷.
Definition 2.1 (α-Differential privacy [7]). A data
access mechanism A satisfies α-differential privacy4 if for
any neighboring databasesD1 and D2, for any query func-
tion Q, r ⊆ Range(Q)5, AQ(D) is the mechanism to return
an answer to query Q(D),
supr⊆Range(Q)
Pr(AQ(D) = r|D = D1)
Pr(AQ(D) = r|D = D2) ≤ e
α (1)
α is also called privacy budget.
Note that it’s implicit in the definition that the privacy pa-
rameter α can be made public.
Definition 2.2 (Sensitivity). For arbitrary neighbor-
ing databases D1 and D2, the sensitivity of a query Q is the
maximum difference between the query results of D1 and D2,
SQ = max|Q(D1)−Q(D2)|
For example, if one is interested in the population size of
0 ∼ 30 old, then we can pose this query:
• Q1: select count(*) from data where 0 ≤ age ≤ 30
Q1 has sensitivity 1 because any change of 1 record can only
affect the result by 1 at most.
Definition 2.3 (Laplace mechanism). Laplace mech-
anism[10] is such a data access mechanism that given a user
query Q whose true answer is θ, the returned answer θ˜ is
AQ(D) = θ + N˜(α/S) (2)
N˜(α/S) is a random noise of Laplace distribution. If S = 1,
the noise distribution is like equation (3).
f(x, α) =
α
2
exp(−α|x|); (3)
For S 6= 1, replace α with α/S in equation (3).
Theorem 2.1 ([10, 7]). Laplace mechanism achieves α-
differential privacy, meaning that adding N˜(α/SQ) to Q(D)
guarantees α-differential privacy.
2.2 Utility
For a given query Q, denote θ the true answer of Q.
By some inference methods, a point estimation θˆ can be
obtained by some metrics, like Mean Square Error(MSE)
E[(θˆ − θ)2]. Different from point estimation, interval esti-
mation specifies instead a range within which the answer
lies. We introduce (, δ)-usefulness[3] first, then show that
it’s actually a special case of credible interval, which will be
used in this paper.
Definition 2.4 ((, δ)-usefulness [3]). A query answer-
ing mechanism is (, δ)-useful for query Q if Pr(|θˆ − θ| ≤
) ≥ 1− δ.
Definition 2.5 (credible interval[12]). Credible in-
terval with confidence level 1 − δ is a range [L,U ] with the
property:
Pr(L ≤ θ ≤ U) ≥ 1− δ (4)
4Our definition is consistent with the unbounded model
in[15].
5Range(Q) is the domain of the differentially private answer
of Q.
In this paper, we let 2 = U − L to denote the length of
credible interval. Note when θˆ is the midpoint of L(Θ˜) and
U(Θ˜), these two definitions are the same and have equal .
Thus (, δ)-usefulness is a special case of credible interval.
An advantage of credible interval is that users can specify
certain intervals to calculate confidence level. For example,
a user may be interested in the probability that θ is larger
than 10.
In our online system, the utility requirement is the 1 − δ
credible interval whose parameter δ is specified by a user
to demand the confidence level of returned answer. Intu-
itively, the narrower the interval, the more useful the answer.
Therefore, we also let users specify the parameter  so that
the length of interval can not be larger than 2, U −L ≤ 2.
2.3 Bayesian Updating
The essence of Beyesian inference is to update the prior
belief by the learned information(observations), which is ac-
tually a set of differentially private answers in this paper.
Assume a set of observations is given as θ˜1, θ˜2, · · · , θ˜n. In
step i, denoted fi−1(θ) the prior belief of θ, which can be
updated using the observation θ˜i by Bayes’ law as follows:
fi(θ) = fi−1(θ)
Pr(θ˜i = θ|θ)
Pr(θ˜i)
(5)
where fi(θ) is the posterior belief at step i. It is also the
prior belief at step i+ 1.
Above equation justifies why we use uninformative prior
belief(also called a priori probability[12] in some literature)
as the original prior belief because any informative(evidential)
prior belief can be updated from uninformative belief. It is
the same we take either the informative prior belief or the
posterior belief updated from uninformative prior belief as
the prior belief.
2.4 Data model and example
2.4.1 Data
Consider a dataset withN nominal or discretized attributes,
we use anN -dimensional data cube, also called a base cuboid
in the data warehousing literature [19, 6], to represent the
aggregate information of the data set. The records are the
points in the N -dimensional data space. Each cell of a
data cube represents an aggregated measure, in our case,
the count of the data points corresponding to the multidi-
mensional coordinates of the cell. We denote the number
of cells by n and n = |dom(A1)| ∗ · · · ∗ |dom(AN )| where
|dom(Ai)| is the domain size of attribute Ai.
xx
Income
ID Age Income 21
2010
>50K
1 0~30 0~50K
x3 x4
20 10
0~50
2 0~30 >50K
… … …
0~30 >30
K
60 >30 >50K
Age
Figure 1: Example original data represented in a rela-
tional table (left) and a 2-dimensional count cube (right)
• Example. Figure 1 shows an example relational dataset
with attribute age and income (left) and a two-dimensional
count data cube or histogram (right). The domain val-
ues of age are 0∼30 and > 30; the domain values of
income are 0∼50K and > 50K. Each cell in the data
cube represents the population count corresponding to
the age and income values. We can represent the orig-
inal data cube, e.g. the counts of all cells, by an n-
dimensional column vector x shown below.
x =
[
10 20 20 10
]T
(6)
2.4.2 Query
We consider linear queries that compute a linear combi-
nation of the count values in the data cube based on a query
predicate.
Definition 2.6 (Linear query [18]). A set of linear
queries Q can be represented as an q×n-dimensional matrix
Q = [Q1; . . . ;Qq] with each Qi is a coefficient vector of x.
The answer to Qi on data vector x is the product Qix =
Qi1x1 +Qi2x2 + · · ·+Qinxn.
• Example. If we know people with income ≤ 50K
don’t pay tax, people with income > 50K pay 2K
dollars, and from the total tax revenue 10K dollars are
invested for education each year, then to calculate the
total tax, following query Q2 can be issued.
– Q2: select 2∗count() where income > 50 − 10
Q2 = [ 2 2 0 0 ] (7)
AQ2 = Q2 · x + N˜(α/SQ2) (8)
Q2 has sensitivity 2 because any change of 1 record can
affect the result by 2 at most. Note that the constant
10 does not affect the sensitivity of Q2 because it won’t
vary for any record change 6. Equation (7) shows the
query vector of Q2. The returned answer AQ2 from
Laplace mechanism are shown in equation (8) where α
is the privacy cost of Q2.
Given a m × n query “history” H, the query answer for
H is a length-m column vector of query results, which can
be computed as the matrix product Hx.
2.4.3 Query history and Laplace mechanism
For different queries, sensitivity of each query vector may
not be necessarily the same. Therefore, we need to compute
the sensitivity of each query by Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. For a linear query Q, the sensitivity SQ is
max(abs(Q)).
where function “abs()” to denote the absolute value of a
vector or matrix, meaning that for all j, [abs(Q)]j = |Qj |.
max(abs(Q)) means the maximal value of abs(Q).
We can write the above equations in matrix form. Let
y, H, α and S be the matrix form of AQ, Q, α and S re-
spectively. According to Lemma 2.1, S = maxrow(abs(H))
where maxrow(abs(H)) is a column vector whose items are
the maximal values of each row in abs(H).
6So we ignore any constants in Q in this paper.
Equations(9, 10) summarize the relationship of y, H, x,
N˜ and α.
y = Hx + N˜(α./S) (9)
S = maxrow(abs(H)) (10)
where operator ./ means ∀i, [α./S]i = αi/Si.
• Example. Suppose we have a query history matrix H
as equation (11), x as equation (6) and the privacy pa-
rameter A used in all query vector shown in equation
(12).
H =

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
2 1 0 0
0 0 2 -1
0 -1 0 1

(11)
α =
[
.05 .1 .05 .1 .1 .05 .05 .1
]T (12)
Then according to Lemma 2.1, S can be derived in
equation (13).
S =
[
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
]T
(13)
Therefore, the relationship of y, H, A and S in equa-
tion (9) can be illustrated in equation (14)
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
 =

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
2 1 0 0
0 0 2 -1
0 -1 0 1
 x + N˜

0.05/1
0.1/1
0.05/1
0.1/1
0.1/1
0.05/2
0.05/2
0.1/1
 (14)
3. THE BEST LINEAR UNBIASED ESTI-
MATOR
Given a set of target queries as Q and equations (9,10), the
BLUE can be derived in the following equation by Gauss-
Markov theorem or Generalized Least Square method so
that MSE(xˆ) can be minimized.
xˆ = (HT diag2(α./S)H)−1HT diag2(α./S)y (15)
where function diag() transforms a vector to a matrix with
each of element in diagonal; diag2() = diag() ∗ diag(). For
estimatability, we assume rank(H) = n. Otherwise x may
not be estimable 7.
Theorem 3.1. To estimate Θ = Qx, which is a q × 1
query vector, Q ∈ Rq×n, the linear estimator Θˆ = Ay
achieves minimal MSE when
A = Q(HT diag2(α./S)H)−1HT diag2(α./S) (16)
In the rest of the paper, we will focus on a query. Thus
we assume Q ∈ R1×n and θ = Qx. However, this work can
be easily extended to multivariate case using multivariate
Laplace distribution[11].
7However, Θ = Qx may also be estimable iff Q =
Q(HTH)−HTH where (HTH)− is the generalized inverse
of HTH.
Corollary 3.1. θˆ is unbiased, meaning E(θˆ) = θ.
Corollary 3.2. The mean square error of θˆ equals to
variance of θˆ,
MSE(θˆ) = Var(θˆ) = 2Q(HT diag2(α./S)H)−1QT (17)
A quick conclusion about (, δ)-usefulness can be drawn
using Chebysheve’s inequality.
Theorem 3.2. The (, δ)-usefulness for θ is satisfied when
δ = V ar(θˆ)
2
, which means
Pr(|θ − θˆ| ≤ ) ≥ 1− V ar(θˆ)
2
(18)
However, the above theorem only gives the bound of δ
instead of the probability Pr(|Θi − Θˆi| ≤ ) which can be
derived by Bayesian inference.
• Example. Let Q = [ 1 0 1 0 ], y = [30.8, 30.3, 46.9,
20.2, 30.4, 68.9, 38.9, 9.5]T . First, we can derive
diag(α./S) as
diag(α./S) =

.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 .05 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 .1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 .1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 .025 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 .025 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1

Then by Theorem 3.1, we have xˆ = [24.9, 10.1, 17.0, 19.5]T ,
θˆ = 42.0.
4. BAYESIAN INFERENCE
In equation (5), Bayesian inference involves three major
components: prior belief, observation(s) and the conditional
probability Pr(θ˜i|θ). Then from last section, an estimator
θˆ = Ay can be obtained. We take uninformative prior belief,
meaning we do not assume any evidential prior belief about
θ. Because Pr(θ˜i) can be calculated as
∫
f(θ˜i|θ)fi−1(θ)dθ,
the remaining question is to calculate the conditional prob-
ability Pr(θ˜i = θ|θ).
We denote fZ(z) a probability function of Z, fZ(x) a prob-
ability function of Z with input variable x. For example, if
fN˜ (x) is the probability function of N˜ whose probability
function is shown in equation (3), following equation shows
fN˜ (z).
fN˜ (z) =
α
2
exp(−α|z|); (19)
Then Pr(θ˜i = θ|θ) = fθ(z)|θ=z.
4.1 Theoretical Probability Function
Lemma 4.1. The probability function of fθ(θ) is the prob-
ability function of fAN˜(Ay− θ).
Proof.
θˆ = Ay = A(Hx + N˜) = Qx + AN˜ = θ + AN˜
=⇒ θ = Ay−AN˜
=⇒ Pr(θ = θ) = Pr[AN˜ = Ay− θ]
Because of the above equation, we have
fθ(θ) = fAN˜(Ay− θ)
Theorem 4.1. The probability function of θ is
fθ(θ) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−it(Ay− θ))
m∏
k=1
α2k
α2k + (A
2
kS
2
k)t
2
dt
(20)
Proof. The noise for a query with sensitivity Si is Lap(αi/Si).
It’s easy to compute the characteristic function of Laplace
distribution is
ΦN˜i(t) =
α2i
S2i t2 +α
2
i
(21)
AN˜ =
∑m
k=1 AkN˜k, so the characteristic function of AN˜ is
ΦAN˜ =
m∏
k=1
α2k
S2kA
2
kt
2 +α2i
(22)
Then the probability function of AN˜ is
fAN˜(θ) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−itθ)
m∏
k=1
α2k
α2k + (A
2
kS
2
k)t
2
dt
Therefore, by Lemma 4.1, we have equation (20).
The probability function can also be represented in a closed
form using multivariate Laplace distribution in [11]. It has
also been proven in [11] that linear combination of Laplace
distribution is also multivariate Laplace distributed. To re-
duce the complexity, the probability function of sum of n
identical independent distributed Laplace noises can be de-
rived as follows[14].
fn(z) =
αn
2nΓ2(n)
exp(−α|z|)
∫ ∞
0
vn−1(|z|+ v
2α
)n−1e−vdv
(23)
We can see that even the above simplified equation be-
comes theoretically hard to use when n is large. More prob-
ability functions can be found in [16].
To circumvent the theoretical difficulty, two algorithms,
Monte Carlo(MC) and discrete probability calculation(PC)
method, are proposed to approximate the probability func-
tion. Error of the approximation is defined to measure the
accuracy of the two algorithms. By comparing the error
and computational complexity, we discuss that both of them
have advantages and disadvantages.
4.2 Monte Carlo Probability Function
We show the algorithm to derive Monte Carlo probabil-
ity as follows. It uses sampling technique to draw random
variables from a certain probability function. We skip de-
tailed sampling technique, which can be found in literature
of statistics, like [12, 1, 16].
Algorithm 1 Derive the probability function of θ by Monte
Carlo method
Require: ms: sample size for a random variable; α: pri-
vacy budget; S: sensitivity; A: θ = Ay; m: H ∈ Rm×n
1. Y = 0, which is a ms × 1 vector;
for k = 1; k < m; k + + do
Draw ms random variables from distribution
Lap(αk/Sk); denote the variables as Xk;
multiply Ak to Xk, denote as AkXk;
Y = Y + AkXk;
end for
2. Y = round(Y).
3. Plot the histogram of Y:
3.1 |u| = 2 ∗max(abs(Y)) + 1.
3.2 u = hist(Y,− |u|−1
2
: 1 : |u|−1
2
)/ms.
return The probability mass vector u
The function round(Y) rounds the elements of Y to the
nearest integers. The purpose of step 3 is to to guarantee
|u| is an odd number. In step 4, function hist(Y,− |u|−1
2
:
1 : |u|−1
2
) returns a vector of number representing the fre-
quency of the vector − |u|−1
2
: 1 : |u|−1
2
. For example,
u[1] =
∑ms
i=1 b(Yi = − |u|−12 )/ms; u[i] =
∑ms
i=1 b(Yi =
− |u|−1
2
+ i)/ms where i ∈ Z and b() is a bool function that
returns 1 as true, 0 as false.
The returned vector u is a probability mass function in a
discretized domain. Following definition explains a proba-
bility mass vector v.
Definition 4.1. a probability mass vector vz is the prob-
ability mass function of z so that
vi =
∫ i− |v|
2
i− |v|
2
−1
fz(z)dz = Fz(i− |v|
2
)− Fz(i− |v|
2
− 1)
where |v| is the length of v, fz(z) is the probability density
function of z, Fz() is the cumulative distribution function.
Note that |v| should be an odd number implicitly to guar-
antee the symmetry of probability mass vector.
For example, if v = [0.3, 0.4, 0.3], it means v1 =
∫ −0.5
−1.5 fz(z)dz =
0.3, v2 =
∫ 0.5
−0.5 fz(z)dz = 0.4, v3 =
∫ 1.5
0.5
fz(z)dz = 0.3.
Following theorem can be proven with Central Limit The-
orem.
Theorem 4.2. u in Algorithm 1 converges in probability
to AN˜, which means ∀δ > 0
limms→∞Pr(|ui − Pr(i−
|u|
2
− 1 ≤ AN˜ < i+ |u|
2
)| < δ) = 1
(24)
At last, by Lemma 4.1, we can derive the probability of θ
by the following equation.
ui = Pr(Ay +
|u|
2
− i < θ ≤ Ay + |u|
2
− i+ 1) (25)
• Example. First we can calculate A.
A = [ 0.48 0.36 −0.03 0.50 −0.50 0.26 0.07 0.24 ]
(26)
Let Sample size ms = 10
6. First, generate 106 random
variables from Laplace distribution Lap(0.05). Denote
the random variables as the vector X1. Then gen-
erate 106 random variables from Lap(0.1), denoted
as X2. Let Y = 0.48X1 + 0.36X2. Similarly, gen-
erate all the random variables from Laplace distri-
butions Lap(α./S). Finally we have a vector Y =∑
(Ak. ∗Xk). Next we round Y to the nearest inte-
gers. max(Y) = 466, min(Y) = −465. It means the
range of Y is in [−465, 466]. So let |u| = 2∗466 + 1 =
933. At last we make a histogram of Y in the range
[−466, 466]. As in Equation (25), It represents the
probability mass vector of θ. For example, u[465] is
Pr(42 − 1.5 ≤ θ < 42 − 0.5). Figure 2 shows the the
probability mass function of θ.
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Figure 2: Probability mass function of θ.
4.2.1 Error Analysis
We use the sum of variance to measure the quality of the
probability mass vector.
Definition 4.2. For a probability mass vector u, the er-
ror of u is defined as:
error(u) =
∑
ui
(ui − E(ui))2 (27)
Because each ui is a representation of Yi = b(Ay+
|u|
2
−i <
θ ≤ Ay+ |u|
2
−i+1)/ms, error(u) is actually (ms−1)∑σ2Yi
where σ2Yi is the variance of Yi.
Theorem 4.3. The error of u in Algorithm 1 satisfies
error(u) <
σ2
ms
z
where z ∼ χ2(|u|) and σ2 is the maximum variance among
u.
Proof.
error(u) =
∑
ui∈u
(ui − E(ui))2
=
σ2
ms
∑
ui∈u
[
√
ms
σ
(ui − E(ui))]2 where (σ = max(σi))
<
σ2
ms
∑
ui∈u
[
√
ms
σi
(ui − E(ui))]2
In u, each ui represents a value derived by Monte Carlo
method. By Central Limit Theorem[12],
√
ms
σi
(E(ui) − ui)
converges in probability to Gaussian distribution G(0, 1)
with mean 0 and variance 1. Then
∑
ui∈u[
√
ms
σi
(ui−E(ui))]2
converges in probability to χ2(|u|) where χ2(|u|) is the Chi-
Square distribution with freedom |u|.
Corollary 4.1. The expected error of u in Algorithm 1
is
E(error(u)) <
|u|
ms − 1max(u)(1−max(u))
Proof. Recall that each ui is the representation of Yi =
b(Ay+ |u|
2
− i < θ ≤ Ay+ |u|
2
− i+ 1). Thus the variance of
ui should be calculated as σ
2
i =
1
ms−1
∑ms
j=1(Yij − E(Yi))2.
Therefore,
σ2 = max(σ2i ) = max[
1
ms − 1
ms∑
j=1
(Yij − ui)2]
= max[
1
ms − 1(uims(1− ui)
2 + (1− ui)msu2i )]
= max[
ms
ms − 1ui(1− ui)]
=
ms
ms − 1max(u)(1−max(u))
Because the expectation of χ2(|u|) is E(z) = |u|, by Theo-
rem 4.3, E(error(u)) < |u|
ms−1max(u)(1−max(u)).
Because ui ∈ [0, 1], max(u)(1 − max(u)) ∈ [0, 0.25].
The larger |u|, the smaller ms, the bigger error of u, vice
versa. However, we cannot control |u| and max(u), which
are determined by A, S, α and m. Thus the only way to
reduce the error of u is to enlarge the sample size ms. But
the computational complexity also rises with ms, which is
analyzed as follows.
4.2.2 Complexity Analysis
Theorem 4.4. Algorithm 1 takes time O(m ·ms).
Proof. To construct m×ms random variables, it takes
m×ms steps. The sum, round and hist operation also take
m×ms each. So the computational time is O(m ·ms).
Note that to guarantee a small error, a large ms is expected
at the beginning. However, the computational complexity
is polynomial to m. The running time does not increase too
fast when m rises.
4.3 Discrete Probability Calculation
Because we know the noise N˜k has sensitivity Sk and
privacy budget αk, the cumulative distribution function
FAkN˜k (z) =
1
2
exp(
αkz
SkAk
)
Then we can calculate all the probability mass vectors for
AkN˜k.
Next we define a function conv(u,v) that convolves vec-
tors u and v. It returns a vector w so that
wk =
∑
j
ujvk−j+1 (28)
|w| = |u|+ |v| − 1 (29)
Obviously the conv() function corresponds to the convolu-
tion formula of probability function. Therefore, conv(u,v)
returns the probability mass vector of u + v.
Recall the following equation, we can calculate the convo-
lution result for all AN˜.
AN˜ =
m∑
k=1
AkN˜k (30)
Algorithm 2 describes the process of discrete probability cal-
culation.
Algorithm 2 Discrete probability calculation
Require: A, N˜, S, α, γ
1. Construct all probability mass vectors of AkN˜k, k =
1, · · · ,m:
for k = 1; k < m; k + + do
Choose length |v|k = ceil( |Ak|Skln(m/γ)αk ) + 1 where
function ceil() rounds the input to the nearest integer
greater than or equal to the input.
construct all the probability mass vectors vk for AkN˜k;
end for
2. Convolve all v: u = conv(v1, · · · ,vm);
return probability mass vector u as the discretized prob-
ability function of AN˜;
• Example. Let γ = 0.01. We can calculate the length
of v1 is |v|1 = 2∗0.48∗1∗log(8/0.01)/0.05 = 128. Then
let |v|1 = 129, meaning we only need to construct
the probability mass between −64 and 64. We know
the cumulative distribution function of Laplace distri-
bution, Pr(z ≤ A1N˜1 < z + 1) = 12exp(α1(z+1)S1A1 ) −
1
2
exp( α1z
S1A1
). Similarly, we can construct all the prob-
ability mass vectors for all AkN˜k. Finally we convolve
them together. The result u represents the probability
mass vector of θ. Figure 3 shows the the probability
mass function of θ.
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Figure 3: Probability mass function of θ.
4.3.1 Error Analysis
Lemma 4.2. If probability loss L is defined to measure the
lost probability mass of a probability mass vector vAkN˜k , then
L(vk) = exp(− αk|v|k
2|Ak|Sk ) = γ/m (31)
Proof.
L(vk) =
∫ −|v|k/2
−∞
αk
2|Ak|Sk exp(
αkz
|Ak|Sk )dz
+
∫ ∞
|v|k/2
αk
2|Ak|Sk exp(
αkz
|Ak|Sk )dz
= exp(− αk|v|k
2|Ak|Sk )
Lemma 4.3. The probability loss of Algorithm 2 is
L(u) =
m∑
k=1
exp(− αk|v|k
2|Ak|Sk ) = γ (32)
Note |v|k is a predefined parameter, |v|k = − 2AkSkln(γ/m)αk ,
but |u| is the length of the returned u.
Theorem 4.5. The error of u of in Algorithm 2 satisfies
error(u) < γ2
Proof.
error(u) =
∑
ui∈u
(ui − E(ui))2 < [
∑
ui∈u
(ui − E(ui))]2
= [L(u)]2 = γ2
The trick to guarantee error(u) < γ2 is to choose |v|k. How-
ever, the growth rate of |v|k with m and γ is very slow. For
example, even if m = 106 and γ = 10−20, −ln(γ/m) = 60.
So it is important to conclude that the error of Algorithm 2
can be ignored. The error in numerical calculation, which is
inevitable for computer algorithm, would be even more note-
worthy than error(u). Although the error is not a problem,
the computational complexity increases fast.
4.3.2 Complexity Analysis
Theorem 4.6. Let β = sum2(|A|diag(S./α)), Algorithm
2 takes time O(log2(m/γ)β).
Proof. To construct a probability mass vector, it needs
|v|k steps where |v|k = − 2|Ak|Skln(γ/m)αk . Then it takes
ln(m/γ)
∑m
k=1 2|Ak|Sk/αk steps to construct all the proba-
bility mass vectors. For any convolution conv(vi,vj), with-
out loss of generality, we assume |v|i ≥ |v|j . Then it takes
(1+|v|j)|v|j+(|v|i−|v|j)|v|j = |v|i|v|j+|v|2j/2+|v|j/2. Be-
cause we know the length of |v| in all the convolution steps
according to the property of convolution in equation (29),
the first, · · · to the last convolution takes |v|2|v|1 + |v|21/2+
|v|1/2, · · · , (|v|1+|v|2+· · ·+|v|m−1)|v|m+|v|2m/2+|v|m/2.
For the all convolutions, it takes 4(ln2(m/γ)
∑m
j=1,k=1
|AjAk|SjSk
αjαk
).∑m
j=1,k=1
|AjAk|SjSk
αjαk
can be written as 1
2
(
∑m
k=1 |AjSj/αj |)2−
1
2
∑m
k=1 |AjSj/αj |2, then the complexity can be written as
O(log2(m/γ)sum2(|A|diag(S./α))). Because by Theorem
3.1 A is determined by H, Q, α and S, the computational
complexity is also determined by H, Qi, α and S.
An important conclusion which can be drawn from the
above analysis is to convolve all v from the shortest to the
longest. Because the running time is subject to the length
of vectors, this convolution sequence takes the least time.
4.4 Summary
To acquire a small error γ2, the big sample size of Monte
Carlo method would always be expected. But the error re-
quirement can be easily satisfied by probability calculation
method without significant cost8. However, the running
time of Monte Carlo method increases slower than prob-
ability calculation method. Therefore, when log2(m/γ)β
is small, probability calculation method would be better.
When log2(m/γ)β becomes larger, Monte Carlo method would
be more preferable.
5. APPLICATION
The proposed inference mechanism can be used in many
scenarios such as parameter estimation, hypothesis testing
and statistical inference control. For example, to control
the inference result of an adversary who assumes a claim C
that the θ ∈ [L0, U0], one may want to obtain the probabil-
ity Pr(C) using the inference method. Once Pr(C) becomes
very high, it means the attacker is confidence about the
claim C to be true. Then further queries should be declined
or at least be carefully answered(only returning the infer-
ence result of a new-coming query is one option). In this
way, the statistical inference result can be quantified and
controlled. In this paper, we show how to apply the mecha-
nism into a utility-driven query answering system. Following
assumption(which holds for all differentially private system)
are made at the first place.
We assume the cells of the data are independent or only
have negative correlations [22]. Generally speaking, this
means adversaries cannot infer the answer of a cell from
any other cells. specifically, cells are independent if they do
not have any correlation at all; cells are negative correlated9
if the inference result is within the previous knowledge of the
adversary. So the inference from correlation does not help.
In this case, the composability of privacy cost[20] holds as
follows.
Theorem 5.1 (Sequential Composition [20]). Let Mi
each provide αi-differential privacy. The sequence of Mi
provides (
∑
iαi)-differential privacy.
Theorem 5.2 (Parallel Composition [20]). If Di are
disjoint subsets of the original database and Mi provides αi-
differential privacy for each Di, then the sequence of Mi
provides max(α)-differential privacy.
5.1 Framework of Query-answering System
We allow a user require the utility of an issued query Q
in the form of 1 − δ credible interval with length less than
2. If the derived answer satisfies user’s requirement, then
no budget needs to be allocated because the estimation can
be returned. Only when the estimation can not meet the
utility requirement, the query mechanism is invoked for a
differentially private answer. In this way, not only the utility
is guaranteed for users, but also the privacy budget can be
saved so that the lifetime of the system can be extended.
We embed a budget allocation method in the query mech-
anism to calculate the minimum necessary budget for the
8We ignore the error of numerical calculation error in com-
puter algorithms
9For two records v1 and v2, it’s negative correlated if
Pr(v1 = t) ≥ Pr(v1 = t|v2 = t).
query. Thus the privacy budget can be conserved. Mean-
while, to make sure the query mechanism can be used to
answer the query, the overall privacy cost of the system is
also. Only when it does not violate the privacy bound to
answer the query, the query mechanism can be invoked.
The framework of our model is illustrated in Figure 4.
Q ε δHA
Diff Private
Bayesian 
InferenceQuery history
User
,  , , y, αQ, α
Original 
Data
.   
Query 
Mechanism
Utility YesNo
L, U, Θ
L U Θ^
^
Q δ  
better than 
required?
,  , , ε, 
L, U, AQ
Figure 4: Framework of query-answering system
5.2 Confidence Level and Credible Interval
If we have a certain interval [L, U ], then the confidence
level can be derived by the probability function of Bayesian
inference. The approach is to cumulate all the probability
mass in this interval. Then the summation of probability
mass would be the confidence level.
In the query-answering system, we let users demand 1− δ
credible interval. This problem can be formulated as fol-
lowing: given the probability function and confidence level
1 − δ, how to find the narrowest interval [L, U ] containing
probability 1−δ? First, it’s easy to prove that the probabil-
ity mass vector is symmetric, which means the probability
function of θ would always be an even function. Because
each Laplace noise N˜i has symmetric probability distribu-
tion, the summation AN˜ is also symmetric. The midpoint
of probability mass vector always has the highest probabil-
ity. Then the approach is to cumulate the probability mass
from the midpoint to the left or right side until it reaches
1−δ
2
. Algorithm 3 summarizes the process.
Algorithm 3 Find the credible interval
Require: probability mass vector v, δ, A, y, i
1. L← Ay; U ← Ay; Cm ← u[|u|/2 + 12 ];
2.
while Cm < 1− δ do
L← L− 1; U ← U + 1
Cm ← Cm + 2u[|u|/2 + 12 + L−Ay];
end while
return L, U
• Example. Assume a user is interested in two ques-
tions: 1. what is the 95% credible interval of θ; 2.
What is the probability that θ > 0?
For question 1, we use Algorithm 3 to derive the cred-
ible interval as [−41, 125]. For question 2, we calcu-
late sum(u(|u|/2− 1
2
− round(θ) + 0), · · · ,u(|u|)), so
Pr(θ > 0) = 0.88. Figure 3 shows the 95% credible
interval.
5.3 Budget Allocation Method
Only when the utility of estimate does not meet the re-
quirement, we need to invoke the differentially private query
mechanism, return A(D) and interval [A(D)−,A(D)+] to
the user, add the query Q to query history H, noisy answer
A(D) to y and allocated budget to α.
Theorem 5.3 shows the budget allocation method which
spends SQ
−lnδ

privacy cost.
Theorem 5.3. Given the utility requirement 1−δ credible
interval with length less than 2, it’s enough to allocate α =
SQ
−lnδ

.
Proof. Let AQ(D) = Q(D) + N˜(α/SQ). Because prob-
ability function of laplace distribution is symmetric, in def-
inition 2.5, [A(D)− ,A(D) + ] gives the most probability
mass.
Pr(− ≤ AQ(D)−Q(D) ≤ )
= Pr(− ≤ N˜ ≤ )
=
∫ 
−
α/SQ
2
exp(−α/SQ|x|)dx
= 2
∫ 0
−
α/SQ
2
exp(α/SQx)dx
= 1− exp(− α/SQ
2
) ≥ 1− δ (33)
So we have α ≥ SQ−lnδ .
5.4 Privacy Cost Evaluation
Note that the system should also be a bounded differen-
tially private system. Therefore, we cannot answer unlim-
ited queries. Given a privacy budget as the total bound, we
should also compute the current privacy cost of the system
to test whether the privacy cost is within privacy budget if
answering the query Q.
The system privacy cost can be derived by Theorem 5.4.
Theorem 5.4. Given current differentially private sys-
tem with query history , denoted by H and privacy cost of
all query , denoted by α, the system privacy cost, denoted
by α¯, can be derived from equation (34, 35).
α¯ = max(B) (34)
B = (α./S)T abs(H) (35)
where B be vector of used privacy budget of each cell, func-
tion diag() transforms a vector to a matrix with each of
element in diagonal, Sumrow means the sum of rows.
Proof. First, we prove for each query Hi in H, the pri-
vacy budget cost of each cell xj is αi/Si ∗abs(Hi); then add
up each cell and each row, we get the result.
For any query Q, the differentially private answer is re-
turned as AQ. Assume an adversary knows all the records
of the data set except one record in cell xj , we define the
local privacy cost for cell xj is αj if AQ is αj-differentially
private where
exp(αj) = supr⊆Range(Q)
Pr[AQ(D) = r|D = D1]
Pr[AQ(D) = r|D = D2] (36)
where D1 and D2 are neighboring databases the same as
definition 2.1. Next we compute the local privacy cost of
each cell for each query.
Denotation
m # of records in history, H ∈ Rm×n
n # of cells, H ∈ Rm×n
ms sample size for Monte Carlo method
β β = sum2(|A|diag(S./α))
α¯ system privacy cost
Ra answering ratio defined in Definition 6.1
Ri ratio of satisfied answers in Definition 6.2
E relative error in Definition 6.3
For each query Hi, the Laplace noise is N˜(αi/SHi) ac-
cording to equation (2). By lemma 2.1 and equation (10), it
is N˜(αi/Si). For the cell xj , assume an adversary knows all
but one record in xj , then the count numbers of other cells
become constant in this query. Thus this query becomes
yi = Hijxj + N˜(αi/Si) + constant. The S of this query is
Hij and the noise of this query is N˜(αi/Si). By Theorem
2.1, it guarantees Hijαi/Si-differential privacy. Then the
budget cost of xj is Hijαi/Si.
By theorem 5.1, the local privacy cost composes linearly
for all queries. Then the local privacy costs can add up by
each query.
Because we assume cells are independent or negatively
correlated in this paper, by Theorem 5.2, the privacy costs
of all cells do not affect each other. Therefore, we prove
equation (35).
The highest privacy cost indicates the current system pri-
vacy cost, denoted by α¯. So we prove equation (34).
• Example. In equation (11), H6 = [2 1 0 0], x1 = 10,
x2 = 20 by equation (6), α6 = 0.05 by equation (12).
According to equation (9), y6 = H6x + N˜(α6/2) =
2x1 + 1x2 + N˜(0.05/2). For the cell x1 with coefficient
2, assume an adversary knows all but one record in
x1, then the count numbers of other cells become con-
stant in this query. So y3 = 20 + 2x1 + N˜(0.05/2) =
2x1 + N˜(0.05/2). The S of this query is 2 and the
noise of this query is N˜(0.05/2). According to Theo-
rem 2.1, it guarantees 0.05-differential privacy. Then
the local privacy cost of x1 is 0.05. Similarly for x2
with coefficient 1, y3 = 20 + 1x2 + N˜(0.05/2), so the
local privacy cost of x2 is 0.025; for x3 with coefficient
0, y3 = 40 + 0 ∗ x3 + N˜(0.05/4), so the local privacy
cost of x3 is 0.
We obtain B = [0.1, 0.275, 0.25, 0.375], thus α¯ = 0.375.
6. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
6.1 Experiment Setup
Environment All the algorithms are written in MAT-
LAB. All the functions in this paper are consistent with
MATLAB functions. All experiments were run on a com-
puter with Intel P8600(2 * 2.4 GHz) CPU and 2GB memory.
Denotation Denotations are summarized in Table 6.1.
The series a:b:c means the series from a to c with space b.
For example, 100:100:500 means 100, 200, 300, 400, 500.
Settings The efficiency of BLUE is shown in section 6.2.
Next the accuracy and efficiency of Bayesian inference is
shown in section 6.3. Finally, we measure the overall per-
formance of a utility-driven online query answering system
in section 6.4.
6.2 BLUE
Because the linear solution θˆ = Ay is used in following
steps, running time of BLUE is measured.
6.2.1 Running Time vs. m
Let m = 100 : 100 : 2000, n = 100, α be a vector of
random variables uniformly distributed in [0, 1], max(S) =
10. The impact of m on the running time is shown in Figure
5(left). Running time increases slowly with m.
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Figure 5: Running time vs. m(left) and n(right)
6.2.2 Running Time vs. n
Let n = 100 : 100 : 2000, α be a vector of random vari-
ables uniformly distributed in [0, 1], max(S) = 10. Be-
cause the linear system should be overdetermined, which
means m > n, we set m = 2n. From Figure 5(right) we
know that running time rise significantly with n, which ac-
tually has verified the motivation of [5] that proposed the
PCA(Principle Component Analysis) and maximum entropy
methods to boost the speed of this step.
6.3 Bayesian Inference
By Corollary 4.1, we can derive a bound for ms, ms >
|u|
γ2
max(u)(1−max(u))+1. However, this is not a sufficient
bound because to implement Monte Carlo method a large
number of sample size is needed in the first place. Therefore,
we set the minimal sample size to be 104. When the derived
bound is larger than 104, let ms be it. So ms = 10
4 <
( |u|
γ2
max(u)(1−max(u))+1)?( |u|
γ2
max(u)(1−max(u))+1) :
104.
6.3.1 Running Time vs. m
Let γ = 0.01, max(S) = 5, n = 100, m = 200 : 100 : 1000.
Figure 6(left) shows that running time of MC rises with m,
which complies with Theorem 4.4. But m does not impact
the running time of PC significantly.
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Figure 6: Running time vs. m(left) and n(right)
6.3.2 Running Time vs. n
Let γ = 0.01, max(S) = 5, m = 500, n = 50 : 50 : 100.
Impact of n is shown in Figure 6(right). Running time PC
increases fast with n. In contrast, parameter n does not
affect running time of MC.
6.3.3 Time and Error of Method PC
Let γ = 0.01, max(S) = 5, m = 1000, n = 100, β =
sum2(|Ai|diag(S./α)). Theorem 4.6 implies that running
time of PC is affected by β. Experimental evaluation in
Figure 7(left) confirms the result. The error defined in Def-
inition 4.2 is also measured in Figure 7(right). Because we
can set γ in the first place, the error of PC does not increase
with β and any other parameters.
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Figure 7: Time(left) and Error(right) of PC vs. β
6.3.4 Time and Error of Method MC
Let n = 100. The sample size ms impacts both time
and error of MC method. Let ms = 10
5 : 105 : 106. The
time and error is evaluated in Figure 8 on left and right
respectively. When ms increases, the running time rises
and the error declines, which complies with Theorem 4.4
and Corollary4.1.
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Figure 8: Time(left) and Error(right) of MC vs.
sample Size
6.4 Utility-driven Query Answering System
Data. We use the three data sets: net-trace, social net-
work and search logs, which are the same data sets with [13].
Net-trace is an IP-level network trace collected at a major
university; Social network is a graph of friendship relations
in an online social network site; Search logs is a set of search
query logs over time from Jan.1, 2004 to 2011. The results
of different data are similar, so we only show net-trace and
search logs results for lack of space.
Query. User queries may not necessarily obey a certain
distribution. So the question arises how to generate the
testing queries. In our setting, queries are assumed to be
multinomial distributed, which means the probability for the
query to involve cell xj is Pj , where
∑n
j=1 Pj = 1. As shown
in Figure 5(right), the running time rises dramatically with
n. For efficiency and practicality, we reduce the dimension-
ality by assuming some regions of interest, where the cells
are asked more frequently than others. Sparse distributed
queries can also be estimated with the linear solution in [5].
Equation (37) shows the probability of each cell.
Pj = 0.9 ∗ 10−floor(
j−1
10
) (37)
where the function floor() rounds the input to the nearest
integers less than it.
To generate a query, we first generate a random number
nt in 1 ∼ 10, which is the # of independent trails of multi-
nomial distribution. Then we generate the query from the
multinomial distribution, equation (38) shows the probabil-
ity of Q.
Pr(Q1 = q1, Q2 = q2, · · · , Qn = qn) =
nt!
q1!q2! · · · qn!P
q1
1 P
q2
2 · · ·P qnn (38)
where
∑
j qj = nt.
Finally, we generate 1000 queries for each setting.
Utility Requirement We assume each query has differ-
ent utility requirement (,δ). Note that  and δ determines
α and α determines β. Therefore the running time of PC
method is related to  and δ. Thus we assume  has a upper
bound 103 and is uniformly distributed.
Metrics Besides system privacy cost α¯ in theorem 5.4,
following metrics are used.
For a bounded system, Once the system privacy cost α¯
reaches the overall privacy budget, then the system cannot
answer further queries. To measure this, we define the ratio
of answered queries as below. In another word, it indicates
the capacity(or life span) of a system.
Definition 6.1. Under the bound of overall privacy bud-
get, given a set of queries Q with utility requirements, the
answering ratio Ra is
Ra =
(# of answers : Pr(L ≤ θ ≤ U) ≥ 1− δ)
(# of all queries)
(39)
Among all the answered queries, we want to know the
accuracy of the returned answer. We use following two met-
rics. 1. Ri is defined to show whether the returned interval
really contain the original answer; 2. E is the distance be-
tween returned answer and true answer. It is easy to prove
that if # of answered queries approaches to infinity, Ri con-
verges to confidence level.
Definition 6.2. For a set of queries with utility require-
ments, the credible intervals [L,U ] are returned. Ratio of
reliability Ri is defined as follows:
Ri =
∑
i∈answered queries(# of answers : L ≤ θ ≤ L+ 2i)
# of all answered queries
(40)
Note that in the experiment we know the true value of θ.
Therefore, Ri can be derived.
Definition 6.3. For each query with (, δ) requirement,
a returned answer θˆ is provided by the query answering sys-
tem. If the original answer is θ, the relative error is defined
to reflect the accuracy of θˆ:
E =
∑
i∈answered queries(|θˆi − θi|/(2i))
# of all answered queries
(41)
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Figure 9: Evaluation of unbounded setting for net-
trace(left) and search logs(right). All x-axes repre-
sent # of queries. First row shows α¯; second row
shows E; third row shows Ri. Improved baseline
means baseline system with dynamic budget alloca-
tion.
In summary, α¯ indicates the system privacy cost; Ra in-
dicates the capacity(or life span) of a system; Ri indicates
the confidence level of returned credible interval [L,U ]; E
indicates the accuracy of the point estimation θˆ.
Settings We use PC inference method for efficiency. The
above four metrics are evaluated in two settings. In the
first setting, the overall privacy budget is unbounded. Thus
Ra = 1 because all queries can be answered. Also a set
of history queries, known as H, is also given in advance.
Although it is not a realistic setting, we can measure how
the system can save privacy budget by our method. In the
second setting, the privacy budget is bounded. ThusRa ≤ 1.
6.4.1 Unbounded Setting
A hierarchical partitioning tree[13] is given using 0.3-differential
privacy as query history to help infer queries. Let 2 be uni-
formly distributed in [50, 103], δ = 0.2.
We improve the baseline interactive query-answering sys-
tem with our budget allocation method(Theorem 5.3), then
it can save privacy budget and achieve better utility. The
improved baseline systems are compared with or without the
Bayesian inference technique. Because we don’t allocate pri-
vacy budget if the estimate can satisfy utility requirement,
privacy budget can be saved furthermore. In Figure 9, Ri
and E also become better using inference technique.
6.4.2 Bounded Setting
For a bounded system, we use both budget allocation and
Bayesian inference to improve the performance. Let the
overall privacy budget be 1; let 2 be uniformly distributed
in [1, 103], δ = 0.2. Figure 10 shows the performance.
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Figure 10: Evaluation of bounded setting for net-
trace(left) and search logs(right). All x-axes repre-
sent # of queries. First row shows Ra; second row
shows E; third row shows Ri. Improved baseline
and OLS solution are improved by our method of
dynamic budget allocation.
Because α¯ reaches the overall privacy budget for about
100 queries, further queries cannot be answered by improved
baseline system. But for our inference system, they may also
be answered by making inference of history queries. This
can increase Ra. Also E and Ri is better than improved
baseline system. We also compared E of OLS solution[18]
with budget allocation method. In our setting, the result
is better than OLS solution because OLS is not sensitive to
utility requirement and privacy cost α. For example, if a
query requires high utility, say 2 = 5, then a big α is allo-
cated and a small noise is added to the answer. But OLS
solution treats all noisy answers as points without any prob-
ability properties. Therefore, this answer with small noise
contributes not so much to the OLS estimate. Then accord-
ing to Equation (41), E becomes lager than the inference
result.
Note that E and Ri is not as good as Figure 9. There
are two reasons. First, we don’t have any query history
at the beginning. So the system must build a query his-
tory to make inference for new queries. Second, when α¯
reaches the overall privacy budget, the query history we have
is actually the previous answered queries, which are gener-
ated randomly. Compared with the hierarchical partitioning
tree[13], it may not work so well. We believe delicately de-
signed query history[27, 18, 13] or auxiliary queries[25] can
improve our system even better, which can be investigated
in further works.
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8. APPENDIX
H matrix of query history;
x original count of each cell;
y noisy answer of H, y = Hx + N˜;
α privacy budget for one query;
α¯ privacy cost for the whole system;
L and U upper and lower bound of credible interval;
  = (U − L)/2;
δ 1− δ is the confidence level;
α privacy cost of each row in H;
S the sensitivity of each row in H;
θ or Q(D) original answer of query Q;
N˜(α) Laplace noise with parameter α;
AQ(D) returned answer of Laplace mechanism:
θ˜ = θ + N˜(α/S);
θ˜ observation of a query: θ˜ = θ +N ;
θˆ estimated answer of Q(D);
N˜ noise vector of y;
